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Abstract 
Consumer confidence indices (CCIs) are a closely monitored barometer of countries’ 
economic health, and an informative forecasting tool. Using European and US data, we 
provide a case study of the two recent stock market meltdowns (the post-dotcom bubble 
correction of 2000-2002 and the 2007-2009 decline at the beginning of the financial crisis) to 
contribute to the discussion on their appropriateness as proxies for stock markets’ investor 
sentiment. Investor sentiment should positively covary with stock market movements 
(DeLong et al., 1990), however, we find that the CCI-stock market relationship is not 
universally positive. We also do not find support for the information effect documented in 
previous literature, but identify a more subtle relationship between consumer expectations 
about future household finances and stock market fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction 
Whether consumer confidence has ‘slipped’, ‘turned up’ or ‘held steady’ is reported by 
the press with almost as much passion as the results of baseball, cricket or soccer matches. In 
many countries consumers are surveyed every month and the ensuing consumer confidence 
indices are closely watched by governments, the business community and politicians. The 
indices are treated as barometers of a countries’ economic health and commonly used as a 
forecasting tool (e.g., by the European Commission). Indeed, academic research confirms 
that consumer confidence indices (CCIs) have predictive power (Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; 
Carroll et al., 1994; Bram and Ludvigson, 1998). More recently, consumer confidence 
indices have also found their way into financial research where they have started to be used 
as a direct proxy for investor sentiment (Qiu and Welch, 2006; Kalotay et al., 2007; Akhtar et 
al., 2011, 2012; Zouaoui et al., 2011; Bathia and Bredin, 2013; Coakley et al., 2013). This 
may be somewhat puzzling because while consumer confidence, and therefore indices 
measuring it, can be expected to be shaped by market fundamentals (Acemoglu and Scott, 
1994; Poterba, 2000), investor sentiment, at least in the sense of DeLong et al. (1990), 
represents the irrational part of the price creation process. Therefore, it is not altogether clear 
whether there are sound grounds to use CCIs, or their components, as a direct proxy for 
investor sentiment. This paper studies the time-varying pattern of the stock market – 
consumer confidence (SM-CC) relationship using European and US data over the 1990-2010 
period in order to address this conundrum.   
It is well documented that changes in stock markets lead changes in economic 
conditions (Bernanke et al., 1999; Poterba, 2000; Tobin, 1969). Consumer confidence 
surveys are constructed to measure consumers’ expectations about future economic 
conditions, hence it is to be expected that changes in stock markets may contribute to the 
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formation of consumers’ opinions about the future state of the economy. Consistent with this 
way of thinking, the literature shows that indeed changes in stock market prices typically 
Granger cause changes in CCIs (Fisher and Statman, 2003; Jansen and Nahuis, 2003; Otoo, 
1999), although this impact is limited to those components of the CCIs which relate to 
economy-wide conditions. There is no consistent evidence that stock markets impact on 
households’ perceptions of their future financial situation. This is somewhat surprising given 
that the financial situation at a household level may depend both on economic conditions 
(e.g., employment prospects), and future stock market returns (if households invest in equity 
directly, or indirectly via retirement schemes). More recently, however, several papers 
analysing the short-term impact of CCIs on stock markets have been published (e.g., Kalotay 
et al., 2007; Ho and Hung, 2009; Akhtar et al., 2011, 2012; Hsu et al., 2011). These papers 
are, in fact, interested in testing the impact of investor sentiment on stock market movements, 
however, by using CCIs as a direct proxy for investor sentiment they implicitly test for the 
explanatory power of CCIs on stock market movements. This seems in contrast with papers 
which look at the long-term relationship between investor sentiment and stock markets. For 
instance, Neal and Wheatley (1998), and Brown and Cliff (2005) also use CCIs to infer 
investor sentiment, however, they extract investor sentiment from CCIs (via 
orthogonalisation), rather than use CCIs as a direct proxy for it.  
So is it sound to use CCIs as a direct proxy for investor sentiment? The lack of a clear 
definition of an empirical measure of investor sentiment leaves scope for numerous 
interpretations. However, DeLong et al. (1990) postulate that investor sentiment and stock 
markets’ movements have a positive relationship. Therefore, if CCIs are to be considered as a 
potential proxy for investor sentiment, they should positively covary with stock markets, too. 
Following from that, we test whether there is a universally positive relationship between 
CCIs and stock markets. If there is, it does not prove that CCIs are suitable proxies for 
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investor sentiment. However, if it does not, then we can conclude that CCIs do not have a 
basic property that investor sentiment should be characterised by and, therefore, they are not 
suitable proxies for investor sentiment.   
It is important to note that some movements of stock markets may carry implications 
for the whole economy whilst other changes may have implications only for sections of the 
economy. In other words, some movements of stock markets may be more informative about 
future economic conditions than others. Consequently, the SM-CC relationship may change 
over time, and, in particular, it should be stronger/weaker when stock market fluctuations 
have stronger/weaker implications for the economy. In this paper we study the two most 
recent big stock market meltdowns, i.e., the 2000-2002 decline of stock markets after the 
dotcom bubble and the 2007-2009 decline of stock markets at the beginning of the financial 
crisis, which are particularly apt for testing changes in the SM-CC relationship. In many 
countries the two crashes resulted in similar (in magnitude) declines in stock markets, but 
unlike the financial crisis decline of 2007-2009, the post-dotcom correction of 2000-2002 did 
not result in economic slowdown in all countries. Therefore, these two stock market declines 
provide a natural experiment to study consumer reactions in both cases and the difference 
between them. Moreover, the crashes were short in duration (less than two years each) and 
occurred within a decade which suggests that the observed phenomena cannot be accounted 
for by long-term changes in stock market characteristics and/or macroeconomic policies. 
Finally, the stock market crashes occurred in many countries, allowing us to address the issue 
as an international phenomenon, not as an individual country effect.  
We test the SM-CC relationship using data for 12 developed EU countries and the US. 
In essence, we have two distinct tests although the relevance of the ‘test’ on the US data 
would be less useful in the absence of the EU results. First, we argue that because in the EU 
5 
 
the post-dotcom crash was not followed by an economic slowdown, the SM-CC relationship 
should weaken during 2000-2002 but not during the 2007-2009 stock market decline, which 
was followed by the global economic downturn. Second, since in the US the post-dotcom 
bubble was followed by economic slowdown, we should not expect to observe a decline in 
the US SM-CC relationship during 2000-2002.  
In brief, we find support for our hypotheses, i.e., we document that the decline in the 
SM-CC relationship during the post-dotcom stock market meltdown is highly statistically 
significant in the EU sample both for the CCI and for the individual questions which are used 
to calculate the index. Moreover, the decline is so severe that the SM-CC relationship stops 
being positive during the post-dotcom crash. This supports the argument against using CCIs, 
or their individual questions, as a proxy for investor sentiment. As hypothesised, no 
significant decline is observed in the SM-CC relationship for the US data. However, a non-
positive co-movement is observed for the question about personal finances and returns of the 
NASDAQ 100 index during the decline of stock markets at the beginning of the recent 
financial crisis.  We interpret this as an indication that US consumers did not perceive the 
decline in the high-tech market in 2008-2009 as an indication of ‘internal mispricing’, so did 
not find the decline in the market helpful in predicting their future financial situation.  
Our results also show that during the post-dotcom decline the co-movement of stock 
market returns with European consumers’ perceptions of their personal financial situation 
weakened substantially. This suggests that consumer confidence with regard to personal 
finances may be driven by the, previously not found, indirect effect (consumers expect they 
will be personally worse off because of the impact of poor future economic conditions on 
their finances) whilst the largely documented direct ‘wealth’ effect (personal finances are 
worse because of the effect of stock market decline on wealth) is comparatively weak.  
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Therefore, the changes in the SM-CC relationship observed on the EU and the US 
markets add to the literature on ‘financial illiteracy’ of the general public and the level of 
penetration of stock markets into societies. Our results suggest that consumers’ awareness of 
stock markets may be more ‘sophisticated’ than the literature on financial illiteracy of the 
general public documents (e.g., Bernheim, 1995, 1998; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2007; 
Mandell, 2004; Moore, 2003; van Rooij et al., 2011).  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature 
review. Section 3 outlines our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data, while Section 5 
presents the methodology and empirical results. Section 6 closes with conclusions.  
 
2. Brief literature review 
Numerous papers show that stock market fluctuations contribute to changes in 
economic conditions through the consumption channel (Poterba, 2000), the investment 
channel (Tobin, 1969) and the balance sheet channel (Bernanke et al., 1999). Given that the 
speed with which stock markets incorporate new information is faster than the speed with 
which macroeconomic conditions change, stock markets are often used as a forecasting tool 
in predicting future economic conditions. 
Obviously, stock markets are not the only source of information that is relevant when 
predicting future economic conditions. Consumer confidence is perceived as an important 
and informative predictor of forthcoming economic changes, alongside typical 
macroeconomic variables like interest rate spreads and money supply.1 For instance, in the 
US, the Consumer Confidence Index published by the Conference Board is officially referred 
to as “a barometer of the health of the US economy from the perspective of the consumer”.2 
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In Europe, the Business and Consumer Survey data are widely used by the European 
Commission for economic surveillance, short-term forecasting, and business cycle analysis 
(DG ECFIN, 2006). For instance, DG ECFIN (Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs) considers the survey as “an essential tool to monitor the economic 
situation in the Member States, the euro area and the EU”.3 
This perception that consumer confidence conveys relevant information for predicting 
future economic conditions is confirmed by academic research. Carroll et al. (1994) find that 
consumer confidence forecasts future changes in household spending in the US in the post-
1954 period. Acemoglu and Scott (1994) come to a similar conclusion using UK data, and 
argue that the predictive ability of confidence indicators is consistent with forward-looking 
behaviour and not with the existence of imperfect capital markets. Bram and Ludvigson 
(1998) confirm the predictive power of consumer confidence indices for total personal 
consumption growth in the US, and Throop (1992) finds that movements in consumer 
sentiment significantly influenced expenditures on consumer durables, but not spending on 
nondurables and services, suggesting that consumer sentiment measures the degree of 
uncertainty held by households, rather than just optimism or pessimism about the future. 
Since both stock prices and confidence indicators lead future economic conditions, the 
causal relationship between them has been subject to many empirical studies. Overall, 
research shows that stock prices and confidence are contemporaneously correlated and that 
changes in stock prices Granger cause changes in confidence (Bathia and Bredin, 2013; 
Fisher and Statman, 2003; Jansen and Nahuis, 2003; Kim and Oh, 2009; Otoo, 1999).4 It is 
argued that stock prices can affect confidence through the traditional wealth effect (higher 
stock prices mean higher wealth and thus greater optimism) or through an information effect 
(higher prices are a sign of favourable economic conditions in the future). Otoo (1999) using 
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US data, Hsu et al. (2011) using a sample of 21 countries worldwide, and Jansen and Nahuis 
(2003) using a sample of 11 EU countries find support for the information effect. There is 
also some evidence that the contribution of stock markets to shaping consumer confidence 
displays long-run trends. Fisher and Statman (2003) and Milani (2008) report that the impact 
of stock market returns on agents’ expectations about future economic output in the US 
declined over time.  
 Consumer confidence has also found applications in the finance literature studying 
the impact of investor sentiment on stock market price formation. Since the seminal paper of 
DeLong et al. (1990), which defines ‘noise trader sentiment’ as the component of 
expectations about asset returns not warranted by fundamentals, many papers have been 
written on how to measure investor sentiment5 and recently consumer confidence indices 
have started to be used as a proxy for it (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Kalotay et 
al., 2007; Barsky and Sims, 2012; Ho and Hung, 2009; Schmeling, 2009; Akhtar et al., 2011, 
2012; Hsu et al., 2011; Yu and Yan, 2011; Stambaugh et al., 2012; Zouaoui et al., 2011; 
Bathia and Bredin, 2013 Coakley et al., 2013). Consumer confidence is being surveyed in 
many countries, so it may appear as a convenient way to pass-by the hurdles of investor 
sentiment measurement, especially since Qiu and Welch (2006) argue that CCIs and investor 
sentiment indices are highly correlated, at least in the US.  
Assessing whether CCIs are a suitable proxy for investor sentiment is not as 
straightforward as a comparison of the correlations between indices measuring consumer and 
investor moods. First, high correlation does not indicate causality. Second, given that it is not 
clear how to measure investor sentiment, and that there is no convincing argument that 
indices of investor sentiment correctly measure investors’ expectations about returns not 
warranted by fundamentals, a direct comparison of CCIs and investor sentiment indices may 
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not be the right way to assess the suitability of CCIs. Therefore, the approach adopted in this 
paper of looking at the properties of consumer confidence and, in particular, assessing 
whether changes in CCIs are characterised by a positive relationship with stock market 
movements (i.e., low sentiment generates downward price pressure), as DeLong et al. (1990) 
postulate for investor sentiment, may be a more suitable approach.  
 
3. Hypotheses statement  
We link the changes in the strength of the SM-CC relationship to whether stock market 
crashes were followed by economic slowdown or not. The last two big stock market crashes, 
the post-dotcom bubble burst (2000-2002) and the post-credit crunch stock market decline 
(2007-2009) create a natural experiment situation to study whether the SM-CC relationship 
was similar or different during these stock market declines. This is because the two crashes 
were similar in size but had different economic consequences in many countries. 
Figure 1 shows stock market indices for nine European markets (Panel A), stock market 
indices for the two US stock markets, NASDAQ100 and NYSE Composite, along with the 
equally-weighted average for the nine EU stock market indices (Panel B), GDP figures for 
the nine EU countries (Panel C), and the US GDP and equally-weighted GDP for the nine 
EU countries (Panel D) over the period January 1990–December 2010.6  All stock market 
indices are monthly and normalised to 100 in January 1990. All GDP statistics are quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted and normalised to 100 in 1990 Q1 for ease of comparison. 
******************** insert Figure 1 here ******************** 
The European stock market indices display a similar pattern, they experienced a sharp 
decline after the dotcom bubble ended and when the credit crunch hit the markets (Panel A). 
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Even though both crashes were similar in magnitude, there is a substantial difference in the 
nature of these two stock market meltdowns. Whilst the collapse of the share prices of high-
tech companies caused severe disturbances on many European stock markets, these effects 
were somewhat concentrated on specific sectors and did not cause strong economy-wide 
repercussions.7 However, although the financial crisis started in the banking sector it quickly 
spread across other sectors and developed into a broad economic downturn (Panel C). 
Turning to the US, its stock markets show a similar pattern to the one observed for the EU 
(Panel B), however, in contrast to the EU countries, the US economy experienced downturns 
following both stock market meltdowns (Panel D). Although the magnitude of the economic 
slowdown was much higher during the financial crisis, the outlooks for the US economy in 
2000 were pretty bleak. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has said repeatedly in 
2000 that the last firewall between the US economy and a recession was consumer 
confidence.8 In January 2001, US confidence dropped. The index published on 31 January 
2001 reported that consumer confidence in the nation’s economic health had taken its biggest 
single-month plunge since late 1990, when the last recession was under way. 
In light of this, if consumers do not discriminate in terms of the implications of stock 
market changes for future economic conditions, then the SM-CC relationship during the two 
stock market meltdowns should be expected to be similar both in the US and in the EU. 
However, if consumers discriminate in terms of the informative power of stock market 
changes for future economic conditions, then we would expect to observe changes in the SM-
CC relationship for the EU countries but not for the US during the post-dotcom correction. 
More precisely, we would expect that for the EU sample the SM-CC relationship weakened 
during the post-dotcom correction (as the decline in share prices was not to be followed by 
an economic slowdown) while no significant difference in the SM-CC relationship between 
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the post-dotcom and the financial crisis stock market meltdowns should be observed for the 
US.  
Moreover, it can be expected that changes in the SM-CC relationship as described 
above should be observed for questions which directly ask about the predictions of economic 
conditions. However, it is not clear whether they directly extend into questions about future 
household financial situation. Past literature suggests that this might not be the case (e.g., 
Jensen and Nahuis, 2003). However, there is a good argument that the personal finances 
questions may respond in the same way as the questions about economic conditions.   
The decline in share prices has a direct negative effect on household finances to the 
extent households hold shares. In this respect, the direct effect resembles the wealth effect if 
wealth is restricted to stock market returns. However, there is also what we can think of as an 
indirect effect, since the decline in the stock market may be informative about future 
prospects of household income from employment, etc. That is, if the decline in stock markets 
is informative about future adverse economic conditions, then this decline may in turn affect 
what households believe their future financial position will be. However, if the decline in 
stock markets is not perceived to be informative about the future economic slowdown, 
household expectations should not be ‘indirectly’ affected by the decline in stock markets. 
Which effect, direct or indirect, is stronger will depend on what proportion of household 
finances directly and indirectly depends on stock markets.  
Grout et al. (2009) report that in the majority of EU countries share ownership of 
individuals is low. Moreover, on average those who hold shares have only a small fraction of 
their wealth invested in stock markets, and, on average, rarely modify their portfolios. 
Therefore, we can expect that the direct wealth effect of stock markets may be relatively 
small. If for the EU sample we observe that during the post-dotcom correction the 
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informative power of stock markets on the perceptions of household finances was lower, then 
we can attribute it to the indirect effect.  
 
4. Data 
To test the SM-CC relationship we need a sample of countries which have consumer 
confidence data collected well before the burst of the dotcom bubble, and have well 
established and sizable stock markets to have grounds to expect that their movement may be 
indicative about economic conditions. We were able to identify 12 EU countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK) and the US which satisfied these requirements.9 For each country we 
collected monthly data on CCIs, stock market indices and macroeconomic variables over the 
period January 1990–December 2010.10 These are described below.  
 
4.1. EU sample 
For all 12 EU countries we use (Composite) CCIs of the European Commission. 
National CCIs are calculated using information collected from surveys that ask the same 
questions across all EU countries. The CCI of each country is based on four forward-looking 
questions: (Qi) Ability to save: Over the next 12 months, how likely is it that you save any 
money? (Qii) Personal finances: How do you expect the financial position of your household 
to change over the next 12 months? (Qiii) Economic situation: How do you expect the general 
economic situation in this country to develop over the next 12 months? (Qiv) Unemployment: 
How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country to change over the next 
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12 months? We collected scores calculated for the CCI and each individual question, and 
calculated their first differences, further denoted by ∆.  
For each EU country we also collected monthly observations of the main stock market 
index:  ATX (Austria), BEL20 (Belgium), OMX Copenhagen 20 (Denmark), OMX Helsinki 
25 (Finland), CAC40 (France), DAX30 (Germany), ATHEX Composite (Greece), FTSE 
MIB (Italy), the AEX (Netherlands), IBEX35 (Spain), OMX Stockholm 30 (Sweden) and 
FTSE 100 (the UK). To account for the fact that the CCI responses are collected over the 
first two weeks of each calendar month, stock market returns, R, are calculated as mid-month 
log returns.11  
Thus, the EU data creates a panel of 12 cross-sections and 252 time observations. Using 
this panel we calculate the time series of averages across countries to which we refer to as 
EU12. The first two columns of Table 1 show summary statistics for this EU12 average. 
******************insert Table 1 here****************** 
 
4.2. US sample 
The US Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) is published by the University of Michigan’s 
Institute for Social Research12 and is based on answers to the following questions: (Qi) 
Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially 
than you were a year ago? (Qii) Do you think that a year from now you (and your family 
living there) will be better off financially, worse off, or just about the same as now? (Qiii) 
Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole, do you think that during the 
next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad times, or what? (Qiv) Which 
would you say is more likely: that in the country as a whole we’ll have continuous good 
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times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of widespread 
unemployment or depression, or what? (Qv) Do you think now is a good or bad time for 
people to buy major household items (e.g., furniture, refrigerator, stove, television, and 
things like that)?   
The retrospective element of the CSI and the way it is calibrated (possible answers, 
method of aggregation, etc.) do not make it directly comparable with the CCIs. However, 
given that the CSI can be seen as a linear transformation of the CCIs, the first difference of 
the CSI (also further denoted by ∆) can be compared with the first difference of the CCI 
(subject to a multiplier).13  
The choice of the US stock market indices was less straightforward than for the EU 
countries. The US is the only country in the world having a stock market dominated by high-
tech companies. Since the impact of the dotcom bubble on the American confidence is one of 
the questions of this study it seems natural to use the NASDAQ100 Index. In addition, to 
balance the analysis we also use the NYSE Composite Index, which covers stocks listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange.14 We use mid-month monthly log returns to allow for a 
direct comparison with the EU sample. The summary statistics of the US time series are 
shown in the last two columns of Table 1. 
 
4.3. Macroeconomic control variables 
It is impossible to control for all potentially important sources of information but, as 
previous research shows, macroeconomic conditions are important in shaping consumers’ 
moods (e.g., Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Milani, 2008). 
Moreover, it can be expected that people are more likely to pay attention to current and 
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forecast macroeconomic conditions than to stock market analysts’ forecasts, especially if the 
level of share-ownership is low.15  
Following past literature and subject to availability and compatibility of the data (e.g., 
we are restricted to using monthly frequency to match the CCIs and the CSI) four 
macroeconomic variables have been collected from DataStream. These are: the harmonized 
(OECD) Consumer Prices Index for the EU countries and the All Items CPI Index for the US 
(for both indexes 2005=100), seasonally adjusted monthly average Industrial Production 
Volume Index, seasonally adjusted monthly average unemployment, and finally, 1-month 
interbank interest rate. Where convenient, rather than list the macroeconomic variables we 
refer to them as Macro, however, when reporting the results we provide coefficients for each 
variable. The difference in logarithm of CPI is referred to as infl, the difference in logarithm 
of Industrial Production is referred to as ind-prod, and the differences in the unemployment 
rates and in the interest rates are referred to as unempl and int-rate, respectively. There is 
evidence that each of these variables impacts on consumer confidence (Acemoglu and Scott, 
1994; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Milani, 2008). 
 
5. Empirical results 
        We begin with a brief discussion of Granger causality between stock market returns and 
changes in consumer confidence for each EU country in our sample, the EU12 average, and 
the US. Even though testing for Granger causality is not central to this research, and Granger 
causality will be implicit when cointegration is found, we present correlations and Granger 
causality results to create a base for a discussion of selected EU countries in Section 5.3.3, 
and to show the differences across countries.   
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         The Schwarz criterion identified that one-month lag is optimal for all the variables of 
interest and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests showed that the stock 
market indices, the EU12 average of the stock market indices, the CCI (or CSI) for individual 
countries and for the EU12 averages are I(1) processes.16 Hence we test for Granger causality 
using the following equation specification: 
tRtRtRRt
tCtCtCCt
RCCR
RCCCC
,
,



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

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where ∆CCt is the change in a CCI (CSI) or in the individual component questions between 
month t and month t-1 and Rt is the corresponding mid-month stock market return. The 
results for individual European countries and the EU12 average are presented in Table 2, and 
for the US CSI, are shown in Table 3. 
********************* insert Table 2 here ********************** 
********************   insert Table 3 here   ********************* 
Consistent with previous literature we find evidence that stock markets Granger cause 
consumer confidence. The results are much stronger for the US than for the individual EU 
countries, although the EU12 average is highly statistically significant. There is no evidence 
of Granger causality in the opposite direction for the US, but it is detected for a few 
European countries, and the EU12. This reversed Granger causality is, however, weak, i.e., 
four out of five statistically significant coefficients indicating causality from CC to stock 
market returns are significant at 10% only. For three countries no Granger causality is 
detected. Interestingly, in Germany, one of the biggest EU economies, there is no statistical 
evidence of causality in either direction for the CCI and every individual question.  
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The differences observed across the EU sample cannot be attributed to using 
inadequate lags given that all the EU individual country CCIs are being collected over the 
same periods of time. The differences in sensitivity of changes in CCIs and stock market 
returns, and vice versa, may therefore reflect differences in individual countries’ levels of 
stock market development (liquidity, volume of trading, capitalisation, etc.), stock markets’ 
significance for raising investment capital, individual investors’ stock market participation 
(direct and indirect), and other country specific effects.  
 
5.1. EU sample 
Stock market–consumer confidence relationship  
To test whether the SM-CC relationship weakened during the post-dotcom crash 
relative to the financial crisis crash we need to define the period of the post-dotcom and of 
the financial crisis stock market declines. Given that one could argue that the results can be 
sensitive to the choice of the periods of stock markets’ distress, we begin by investigating the 
SM-CC relationship using time-varying regressions. Using the Kalman Filter allows 
observing changes in coefficients without prior restrictions on the timing of these changes. 
This flexibility comes at a price, the Kalman Filter is a time series, not a panel, estimator, so 
we use EU12 averages in the Kalman Filter specification. More precisely, we define the 
following measurement equation: 
)(,,, 11211212 ttEUttEUtttEU RCCICCI     
with the transition equations defined as  
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where ∆CCIEU12 denotes the change in the EU12 consumer confidence index, REU12 denotes 
the EU12 monthly stock market returns, and error terms are normally distributed with zero 
means, and constant variances.17  
     Figure 2 shows that indeed the co-movement between the stock market returns and CCI 
varies over time and that it was lowest in the period mid 2000–end of 2001. The  coefficient 
decreased from 0.17 in 1990 (significantly positive) to about 0.05 in the second half of 2000 
(statistically insignificantly different from zero). It increased again from 2002 onwards. The 
period of the financial crisis is characterised by relatively high values of the  coefficient. 
Indeed, the highest values are estimated for 2008.  
******************** insert Figure 2 here ******************* 
Does a similar pattern characterise the relationship between CCI and the macro 
variables? It is not central to the paper to establish what shapes consumer confidence, but as 
we aim to prove that the SM-CC relationship declined during the post-dotcom bubble crash, 
it is important to check whether this decline can be observed for other, not-stock market 
related, variables. To do so, we run specification (1) four times, each time R being replaced 
by the first difference of one of the Macros. All estimated time-paths of the t coefficient are 
considerably flat and none of them has a statistically significant change (decline or increase) 
during the post-dotcom crash. For the sake of space, we show the time-path obtained for the 
industrial production variable, ind-prod, only. This particular variable is chosen because 
industrial production is potentially least sensitive to direct central banks’ and governments’ 
policies and potentially most representative of the state of the economy.        
19 
 
************************** insert Figure 3 here ******************* 
Having established that the decline in the co-movement of stock market returns and 
change in consumer confidence occurred during the period of interest we now perform the 
analysis with time dummies. For each EU country i we define the post-dotcom dummy (DCi) 
and the financial crisis dummy (FCi) as equal to one a month after the highest value of the 
national stock market index is recorded till the lowest value of the index is reached in the 
corresponding period of stock market declines, and zero otherwise.  Obviously, the DC and 
the FC dummies are similar across countries.  
When estimating the relationship between stock market returns and ∆CCI, we have to 
account for the fact that in levels CCIs, stock market indices and macroeconomic variables 
are cointegrated.18 The dynamic nature of the panel specification as well as the fact that we 
have only 12 cross-sections for 252 time observations, i.e., we have a small N and large T 
panel, cause some issues. The sample’s heterogeneity (different levels of stock market 
development, different levels of shareholder ownership, etc.) also needs to be addressed. To 
utilise the panel structure of the data the mean group (MG) estimation technique for 
heterogeneous dynamic panels developed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) is adopted. More 
precisely, the panel regressions are obtained for the following specifications: 
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where CC refers to the CCI or its four individual questions, p refers to the logarithm of the 
mid-month share price indices, Macro refers to a vector of macroeconomic variables as 
defined in Section 4.3, and DC and FC are the time dummies as defined above. The 
specification of the error correction vector follows Pesaran et al. (1999). The foregoing error 
correction is employed to accommodate the fact that consumer confidence measured at each 
point in time reflects consumers’ expectations about the future state of the world. It is 
reasonable to assume that these expectations are shaped by forecasts. Given that these 
forecasts are not available, we use next month values in the foregoing error correction 
specification.19   
         Specification (2) introduces only the DC dummy and its interaction with R as we are 
interested in observing whether the impact of stock market returns declined during the post-
dotcom correction, i.e., whether DC is statistically significantly negative. Specification (3) 
adds the FC dummy and its interactive term with stock market returns. We do not have any 
particular expectations about the significance of this dummy, but we expect that the DC and 
the FC coefficients are statistically significantly different from each other.20  
Table 4 shows the MG estimates of the coefficient of adjustment θ and of the short-run 
coefficients. When only DC is included in the equation specification (Panel A), the estimates 
of the  coefficient are all positive and all, except for one, statistically significant at 1%. All 
the estimates of the DC coefficient are negative and statistically significant at 1% or 5%. 
That is, the decline of stock markets during the post-dotcom bubble correction reduced the 
SM-CC relationship both for the economic and household finance questions. As the trend 
coefficients are not of direct interest, to save space, we do not report them (they can be 
obtained from the authors on request). However, we would like to mention that across all the 
specifications presented in Table 4 the coefficients estimated for p are statistically significant 
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at 1%. The coefficients estimated for the Macro variables vary in their level of statistical 
significance with those estimated for the unemployment remaining consistently statistically 
insignificant.21  
Our results are robust to the alternative specification in which we control for the 2007-
2009 stock market crash (Panel B). Here, all the  coefficients, except for one, are 
statistically significant and all the DC coefficients but one are negative and significant, 
although their significance is slightly weaker than when only the post-dotcom stock market 
collapse was controlled for. In contrast, only two coefficients estimated for FC are 
significant. This result seems to be driven by the unemployment question, i.e., the decline in 
stock markets covaries with consumers’ expectations about the future increase in 
unemployment. The results also show that given that DC and FC are statistically significantly 
different from each other (Panel B, the last column with Wald-tests), the sensitivity of CCI 
to stock market returns was statistically lower during the post-dotcom bubble burst than it 
was during the 2007-2009 stock market collapse. Moreover, because the absolute size of the 
DC coefficient is always larger than the absolute size of the  coefficient, we can conclude 
that during the post-dotcom bubble period the SM-CC relationship was not positive. This is 
consistent with Figure 2. 
************************* insert Table 4 here ************************ 
Finally, we find that, where significant, the sign of the estimated Macro coefficients is 
consistent across specifications. Consistent with our expectations, an increase in 
unemployment covaries negatively with changes in the CCI, and among its individual 
questions it has the greatest coefficient (in absolute terms) for the question about the future 
unemployment. Similarly, increasing inflation is perceived as a bad sign. However, it is a bit 
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puzzling that an increase in interest rates impacts positively on the CCI, and, in particular, on 
the predictions of the future economic situation and decline in unemployment. The positive 
and significant coefficients estimated for the change in the interest rates may indicate that 
consumers may not see that high interest rates increase the cost of borrowing and slow down 
business activities.  
 
5.2. US sample  
The decline in both US stock market indices occurred at the same time, therefore, the 
definition of the DC and FC dummies is straightforward: the DC dummy is equal to one 
between September 2000 and September 2002 (zero otherwise) and the FC dummy is equal 
to one between November 2007 and February 2009 (zero otherwise). Using these dummy 
specifications we run error correction model (ECM) regressions as specified by Equations (2) 
and (3) for the returns of the NYSE Composite Index, and of the NASDAQ 100 index. We 
use CSI, Qii (personal finances) and Qiii (economic conditions) as dependent variables. 
Table 5 shows the regression results, and in particular, shows that stock market returns 
are statistically and economically important in explaining CSI. Also, consistently across 
specifications, the  coefficients estimated for the NYSE Composite Index (Panel A) are 
about twice as large as those for the NASDAQ 100 Index (Panel B). However, as the average 
monthly returns of NASDAQ 100 are higher than the average monthly returns of NYSE 
Composite (1.2% and 0.64% respectively), the marginal impact of the two index returns on 
CSI is comparable. None of the DCcoefficients is significant, and all are statistically 
insignificantly different from the corresponding FCs, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis. The FC coefficient estimated for the personal finances question, Qii, in the 
regression for the NASDAQ 100 stock market index is the only statistically significant 
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coefficient. The negative sign of the coefficient indicates that the informative power of the 
NASDAQ in shaping expectations about future financial situation of households declined in 
the 2007-2009 period. This might mean that it was hard to read from the decline of share 
prices of companies traded on NASDAQ whether the decline was permanent, or only 
temporary. The collapse of the market did not seem to be driven by an ‘internal’ overpricing. 
The high-tech sector was not the cause of the financial crisis, and might not be affected by it 
over the next five years. Indeed, the NASDAQ 100 index returned to its pre-financial crisis 
level by the end of the sample. 
********************** insert Table 5 here ********************* 
 
5.3. Robustness tests 
We performed a series of robustness tests to confirm the stability of our findings. We 
used several potential definitions of the post-dotcom and of the financial crisis periods, 
alternative definitions of variables, alternative estimation techniques, as well as looked in 
more detail at the individual country responses given that Granger causality tests are quite 
different for individual EU countries. Below we discuss these robustness tests in detail. 
5.3.1. Using different specifications of the period dummies and returns  
To test robustness of the results we repeated the analysis for various alternative 
definitions of stock market returns, of the DC and the FC dummies, for both the EU sample 
and the US. In more detail, we repeated the analysis using previous month stock market 
returns to account for the fact that consumer responses collected at the beginning of each 
calendar month could not possibly incorporate mid-month stock markets’ positions. We also 
used several definitions of the periods of stock market declines. We determined the period of 
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DC being equal to one by (i) the month of the peak and the month of the lowest EU12 
average stock market index, (ii) the first peak month and the latest lowest month observed for 
the individual country indices, and (iii) the average of individual countries’ periods of the 
highest and of the lowest individual country indices. We also used the FC dummy lasting till 
the end of the sample, i.e., December 2010 given that stock markets were still under turmoil 
through the late 2009 and 2010. We did that because the standard deviation of monthly 
returns for the EU12 stock market index in the period April 2009 till December 2010 was 
5.6%, which although lower than the one observed between September 2007-March 2009 
(6.6%), was still higher than the standard deviation of the post-dotcom correction (5.4%), and 
higher than the standard deviations of the pre-dotcom crash period (4.8%) and of the period 
between the two crashes (3.6%). We have also repeated the US regressions using the EU12 
stock market declines’ dummies, and vice versa. All these modifications had practically no 
impact on the results.  
5.3.2. Cross-sectional dependence 
Potentially, there may be an issue with the MG estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
used to estimate the EU panel. The MG estimator does not take into account that certain 
parameters may be the same across countries. This is a potential limitation because it can be 
expected that the variables in the EU sample display some cross-sectional dependence.  
Pesaran et al. (1999) developed the pooled mean group (PMG) estimation technique for 
heterogeneous dynamic panels which addresses this issue by assuming that long-run 
coefficients are the same across the group. Although this assumption seems also unrealistic 
given our data, we repeated the EU regressions using the PMG estimator to test the 
robustness of our findings. In general, the error correction coefficients estimated with PMG 
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were smaller and more significant than those estimated with MG, however, there was no 
visible impact on the coefficients of interest (i.e., , DC and FC).22  
We also tackled the issue of cross-sectional dependence by repeating the analysis 
using the time series of EU12 averages. Using averages has the advantage that country 
specific effects are diluted, and therefore, only common trends are likely to get picked up. 
Table 6 presents estimates of the error correction model (ECM) of specifications (2) and (3) 
using the EU12 average. The DC and FC dummies are defined by the timing of the peak and 
the bottom of the EU12 average stock market index, i.e., DC is equal to one between March 
2000 and September 2002 (zero otherwise), and FC equal to one between November 2007 
and February 2009 (zero otherwise).  
************************* insert Table 6 here ************************ 
Our earlier findings are fully confirmed. In Panel A all the estimates of  are positive 
and statistically significant at 1% with the exception of the coefficient estimated for Qi 
(ability to save) for which 5% significance is obtained. All the DCs are negative and 
statistically significant. When the FC dummy is added to the regression (Panel B) the results 
hold although the DC coefficient estimated for Qiv (unemployment) becomes 10% significant 
only. In contrast, the FC coefficient estimated for this question is statistically significant at 
1% and positive. All F-tests but one show that DCs are statistically significantly lower than 
FCs. Also, as expected, the significance of macroeconomic variables is much lower than as 
presented in Table 4.   
5.3.3. Individual countries 
Finally, given the diversity of individual EU countries economic and  stock market 
development, differences in attitudes to equity investments, and a different degree of 
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causality documented in Table 2 it is important to look at individual countries. We discuss 
the results for the three leading EU economies: France, Germany and the UK as they provide 
a very interesting sub-sample. They are the leading and biggest economies of the EU.  
Furthermore, they are characterised by very different systems of social security and stock 
market penetration into economy and individual investors’ involvement with the UK being 
most and Germany being least open.  
Tables 7 and 8 present estimates of the error correction model (ECM) of specification 
(2) and (3), respectively, for France (Panel A), Germany (Panel B) and the UK (Panel C). For 
the sake of space for each country the estimates for the corresponding CCI indices and for 
questions about personal finances (Qii) and economic situation (Qiii) are presented. We focus 
on these two questions as they are most informative in our discussion of the SM-CC 
relationship and the existence of the indirect effect of stock markets on predicting financial 
situation of households. 
******************** insert Table 7 here ********************** 
******************** insert Table 8 here ********************** 
The results presented at the EU level are fully confirmed by the individual country 
regressions. First, there is a statistically significant co-movement between the stock market 
returns and changes in consumer confidence, i.e., all  coefficients but one are statistically 
significantly positive in theCCI and the individual questions regressions. However, the 
magnitude of the SM-CC relationship varies from country to country with the UK being 
strongest and Germany being weakest (the UK’s coefficients are 2.5-4 times bigger than 
those estimated for Germany). Second, the negative impact of the post-dotcom crash on the 
SM-CC relationship is also clearly visible. As expected, the effect is most pronounced in the 
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UK. It is somewhat interesting that the weakest effect (in the sense of statistical significance) 
is depicted for France. However, the difference between the coefficients estimated for the 
two time dummies is statistically significant only for the UK and France. This, once more 
confirms that the SM-CC relationship is strongest in the UK. 
Finally, the above results show that the weak Granger causality documented in Table 2 
is not driven by the breakdown in the SM-CC relationship. For instance, the UK has one of 
the most significant Ganger causality results. It also has a highly statistically significant 
decline in the SM-CC relationship during the post-dotcom bubble burst. In contrast, the 
Granger causality tests are highly statistically insignificant for Germany, and the change in 
the SM-CC relationship after the post-dotcom stock market decline is rather weak (only 10% 
significant decline of the DC coefficient). These results indicate that the observed significant 
differences in penetration of stock markets into society and economic life of individual 
countries are likely to be behind the results. Yet, even if the awareness of the equity markets 
may be relatively low in Germany, and therefore, the German results are weaker, the 
direction of inference is as expected.   
 
6. Conclusions  
In this paper, we investigate the time-variation in the stock market–consumer 
confidence (SM-CC) relationship for 12 EU countries and the US over the period 1990-2010. 
We find that, consistent with our hypotheses, the SM-CC relationship decreased in Europe 
when the dotcom bubble ended. This is observed for the aggregate CCIs and the individual 
questions used to construct these indices. In contrast, in the US, the SM-CC relationship 
remained unaffected during the post-dotcom crash. However, we find some evidence that the 
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informative power of the NASDAQ 100 index for shaping future personal finances declined 
significantly during the financial crisis crash.  
DeLong et al. (1990) postulate that investor sentiment and stock market movements 
have a positive relationship. Therefore, the observed lack of the positive SM-CC relationship 
leads us to the conclusion that neither CCIs nor their individual questions are suitable proxies 
for investor sentiment and more research is needed to find reliable proxies for it. 
Our results also show that the indirect impact of stock markets on the perceptions about 
future personal finances was strong in the EU countries. During the post-dotcom stock 
market correction the sensitivity of changes in expectations about future household finances 
to stock market returns declined. This means that the interpretation of the distinction between 
household-finance and economy-wide survey questions made in previous literature in order 
to gauge the relative importance between the wealth effect and the information effect in 
consumer confidence may be spurious. 
The results also indicate that consumers’ understanding of basic market processes may 
be more sophisticated than some earlier research might indicate, and their forecasting 
abilities should not be viewed as simply the result of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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Figure 1. Stock market indices and GDP, 1990-2010. Source: DataStream, OECD. 
Panel A. Stock market indices (Jan1990=100) for nine EU countries, monthly                    
 
 
 
 
Panel B. Stock market indices (Jan1990=100)   for the US and the average of nine EU countries, monthly 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Panel C. Seasonally adjusted GDP (1990Q1=100) for nine EU countries, quarterly     
                                        
                                 
 
Panel D. Seasonally adjusted GDP (1990Q1=100) for the US and the average of nine EU countries, quarterly. 
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Figure 2. Kalman Filter estimate of the  coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals, dotted lines) 
from Eq. 1  
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Figure 3. Kalman Filter estimate of the  coefficient (and 95% confidence intervals, dotted lines) 
from Eq. 1 with REU12 being replaced by ind-prod. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Means and standard deviations of the changes in the CCIs, in the macroeconomic variables and 
in the stock market indices for the EU12 and the US; monthly, %. 
  EU12  USA 
  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St dev. 
Changes in the consumer confidence indices and the scores of the individual questions  
CCI  -0.014  1.478     
CSI      -0.063  4.141 
         Qi (Ability to save)   0.012  1.158     
Qii (Personal finances)  -0.017  0.894  -0.067  5.384 
         Qiii (Economic situation)  -0.013  0.037  -0.143  11.327 
-Qiv (Unemployment)  -2.531  3.075     
         Macroeconomic variables         
 infl   0.179  0.394  0.216  0.334 
ind-prod   0.061  1.011  0.162  0.685 
unempl   0.001  0.103  0.016  0.158 
int-rate  -0.040  0.450  -0.032  0.328 
         Stock market returns         
EU12   0.668  5.270     
NYSE Comp.      0.637  4.473 
NASDAQ 100      1.200  7.400 
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Table 2. Contemporaneous correlations (Panel A) and p-values for the Granger causality test (Panel B) for the 12 individual EU countries and the EU12 average, 
1990-2010.  
 CCI Qi  
        Ability to save 
Qii 
      Personal finances 
Qiii 
   Economic situation 
Qiv 
       Unemployment 
Panel A Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value  Coeff P-value 
EU12 0.436 0.000  0.198 0.002  0.240 0.000  0.386 0.000  0.376 0.000 
Austria  0.239 0.001  -0.011 0.882  0.008 0.910  0.281 0.000  0.291 0.000 
Belgium  0.285 0.000  0.124 0.050  0.216 0.001  0.241 0.000  0.235 0.000 
Denmark  0.111 0.078  0.106 0.094  0.043 0.501  0.006 0.924  0.113 0.073 
Finland  0.229 0.003  0.031 0.675  0.166 0.026  0.243 0.002  0.171 0.021 
France  0.313 0.000  0.157 0.012  0.142 0.024  0.274 0.000  0.265 0.000 
Germany  0.201 0.001  0.127 0.044  0.106 0.093  0.181 0.004  0.164 0.009 
Greece  0.208 0.001  0.089 0.159  0.148 0.019  0.235 0.000  0.158 0.012 
Italy  0.229 0.001  0.109 0.111  0.052 0.452  0.169 0.013  0.255 0.000 
Netherlands  0.207 0.001  -0.130 0.039  0.073 0.250  0.276 0.000  0.191 0.002 
Spain  0.263 0.000  0.120 0.057  0.150 0.017  0.284 0.000  0.201 0.001 
Sweden  0.271 0.000  0.075 0.316  0.102 0.170  0.231 0.002  0.230 0.002 
UK  0.248 0.000  0.101 0.110  0.187 0.003  0.212 0.001  0.214 0.001 
               
Panel B               
 R→∆CC ∆CC→ R  R→∆CC ∆CC→ R  R→∆CC ∆CC→ R  R→∆CC ∆CC→ R  R→∆CC ∆CC→ R 
EU12 0.001 0.070  0.430 0.784  0.016 0.104  0.015 0.141  0.001 0.087 
Austria  0.163 0.099  0.928 0.441  0.282 0.140  0.442 0.250  0.155 0.277 
Belgium  0.090 0.257  0.181 0.105  0.205 0.667  0.588 0.123  0.059 0.094 
Denmark  0.048 0.230  0.976 0.139  0.539 0.893  0.181 0.160  0.003 0.075 
Finland  0.003 0.015  0.705 0.169  0.020 0.121  0.076 0.040  0.000 0.131 
France  0.003 0.516  0.855 0.434  0.048 0.576  0.015 0.732  0.001 0.310 
Germany  0.840 0.746  0.294 0.933  0.717 0.847  0.296 0.888  0.557 0.656 
Greece  0.407 0.834  0.941 0.869  0.688 0.904  0.188 0.706  0.325 0.639 
Italy  0.589 0.490  0.014 0.572  0.702 0.276  0.253 0.506  0.103 0.938 
Netherlands  0.000 0.062  0.500 0.055  0.012 0.912  0.008 0.391  0.000 0.075 
Spain  0.029 0.090  0.668 0.767  0.186 0.011  0.019 0.208  0.015 0.087 
Sweden  0.007 0.859  0.222 0.537  0.419 0.549  0.070 0.695  0.046 0.522 
UK  0.016 0.257   0.032 0.138   0.088 0.858   0.068 0.430   0.062 0.390 
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Table 3. Contemporaneous correlations and results of the Granger causality test for the US, 1990-2010. 
 Correlations 
  
Granger causality test  (P-values) 
 Coeff. P-value  R→∆CC ∆CC→ R 
NYSE Composite     
CSI 0.164 0.009  0.000 0.939 
Qii (Personal finances) 0.039 0.539  0.003 0.687 
Qiii (Economic situation) 0.152 0.016  0.000 0.853 
      
NASDAQ100      
CSI 0.132 0.036  0.000 0.692 
Qii (Personal finances) 0.003 0.963  0.003 0.954 
Qiii (Economic situation) 0.143 0.023  0.000 0.676 
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Table 4. MG estimates of Eq. 2 (Panel A) and of Eq. 3 (Panel B) for the panel of  the 12 EU countries, 1990-2010, and the Wald test of equality between DC and FC. 
Only short-run coefficients are presented. The four Macro variables are: inflation (infl), industrial production (ind-prod), unemployment (unempl) and monthly interest 
rate (int-rate). Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.10. 
  



DC

FC



DC

FC

infl   nd-prod   unempl   int-rate 

ᵪ2 
Panel A                        
CCI -0.203***   0.332**   0.004    0.090***   -0.127***    -0.275   0.009   -2.268**   1.459***   
  (0.019)   (0.149)   (0.003)    (0.016)   (0.037)    (0.172)   (0.035)   (0.978)   (0.446)   
Qi (Ability to save) -0.311***   0.411**   0.002    0.045***   -0.064**    -0.190*   -0.018   -0.717   0.055   
  (0.062)   (0.159)   (0.002)    (0.014)   (0.031)    (0.108)   (0.027)   (0.564)   (0.459)   
Qii (Personal finances) -0.443***   0.251   0.010**    0.024   -0.075**    -0.226   -0.016   -1.704**   0.105   
  (0.042)   (0.384)   (0.004)    (0.017)   (0.030)    (0.157)   (0.074)   (0.667)   (0.327)   
Qiii (Economic situation) -0.218***   0.654**   0.006    0.145***   -0.156**    -0.467*   0.074   -1.586   1.869***   
  (0.032)   (0.267)   (0.004)    (0.028)   (0.070)    (0.242)   (0.060)   (1.090)   (0.666)   
-Qiv (Unemployment) 0.204***   0.200   0.005    0.129***   -0.171***    -0.152   -0.017   -5.502**   3.584***   
  (0.023)   (0.367)   (0.006)    (0.026)   (0.060)    (0.256)   (0.058)   (2.632)   (0.686)   
                        
Panel B                        
CCI -0.235***   -0.002   0.001   -0.021***   0.067***   -0.101***   0.064***   -0.305*   -0.023   -2.163**   1.200***   15.52*** 
  (0.026)   (0.126)   (0.003)   (0.005)   (0.017)   (0.038)   (0.023)   (0.175)   (0.034)   (0.956)   (0.423)     
                                                
Qi (Ability to save) -0.350***   0.118   0.000   -0.020***   0.032**   -0.046   0.019   -0.205*   -0.050*   -0.488   -0.175   3.34* 
  (0.060)   (0.168)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.013)   (0.031)   (0.019)   (0.114)   (0.026)   (0.591)   (0.463)     
Qii (Personal finances) -0.465***   0.022   0.009**   -0.011**   0.011   -0.058**   0.040   -0.254   -0.047   -1.458**   0.015   4.26** 
  (0.039)   (0.414)   (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.015)   (0.026)   (0.033)   (0.164)   (0.071)   (0.698)   (0.331)     
Qiii (Economic situation) -0.246***   0.220   0.003   -0.034***   0.134***   -0.139*   -0.030   -0.423*   0.039   -1.432   1.481**   2.73* 
  (0.038)   (0.169)   (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.031)   (0.075)   (0.047)   (0.256)   (0.064)   (1.021)   (0.657)     
-Qiv (Unemployment) 0.219***   -0.291   -0.001   -0.024***   0.073**   -0.112*   0.252***   -0.296   -0.054   -5.250**   3.094***   19.53*** 
  (0.024)   (0.335)   (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.032)   (0.061)   (0.057)   (0.259)   (0.059)   (2.568)   (0.646)     
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Table 5. ECM estimates of Eq. 3 and the F-test of equality between DC and FC for NYSE Comp. and NASDAQ100 indices, 1990-2010. DC is equal to one for months  
between September 2000 and September 2002 (zero otherwise) and FC is equal to one for months between November 2007 and February 2009 (zero otherwise). The four 
Macro variables are: inflation (infl), industrial production (ind-prod), unemployment (unempl) and 1-month interest rate (int-rate). Standard errors are in parentheses and 
asterisks refer to the level of significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.10. 
  
  



DC

FC



DC

FC infl   nd-prod   unempl   int-rate R
2   F-Test 
Panel A. NYSE Composite  
 
      
CSI -0.002***   0.760***   -0.013   -0.029*   0.215***   0.186   0.148   -3.469***   0.007   1.052   0.830   0.235   0.02 
  (0.000)   (0.226)   (0.009)   (0.015)   (0.066)   (0.211)   (0.170)   (0.746)   (0.428)   (1.751)   (0.783)         
    
 
      
Qii (Personal finances) -0.006***   1.473***   -0.001   -0.069***   0.151*   -0.122   -0.265   -2.233**   -0.686   1.390   -0.009   0.291   0.21 
  (0.001)   (0.288)   (0.011)   (0.018)   (0.082)   (0.263)   (0.214)   (0.931)   (0.535)   (2.170)   (0.968)         
    
 
      
Qiii (Economic situation) -0.002***   2.016***   -0.028   -0.054   0.672***   0.532   -0.009   -10.205***   1.293   4.721   4.546**   0.247   0.63 
  (0.000)   (0.594)   (0.025)   (0.040)   (0.178)   (0.573)   (0.461)   (2.018)   (1.161)   (4.750)   (2.114)         
                          Panel B. NASDAQ 100   
 
      
CSI -0.002***   1.074***   -0.014   -0.049***   0.111***   0.023   0.033   -2.993***   0.143   0.301   0.614   0.223   0.01 
  (0.000)   (0.257)   (0.011)   (0.014)   (0.040)   (0.105)   (0.119)   (0.735)   (0.430)   (1.760)   (0.787)         
    
 
      
Qii (Personal finances) -0.006***   1.625***   -0.000   -0.078***   0.084*   -0.046   -0.319**   -1.956**   -0.497   1.645   -0.108   0.301   2.23 
  (0.001)   (0.308)   (0.013)   (0.017)   (0.050)   (0.129)   (0.147)   (0.904)   (0.525)   (2.156)   (0.962)         
    
 
      
Qiii (Economic situation) -0.002***   3.034***   -0.038   -0.104***   0.318***   0.036   -0.065   -9.308***   1.937*   2.930   3.858*   0.239   0.06 
  (0.000)   (0.676)   (0.029)   (0.038)   (0.110)   (0.285)   (0.321)   (1.985)   (1.165)   (4.763)   (2.118)         
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Table 6. ECM estimates of Eq. 2 (Panel A), and of Eq. 3 (Panel B) for the EU12 average, 1990-2010, and the F-tests of equality between DC and FC . DC is equal to one for 
months between March 2000 and September 2002 (zero otherwise) and FC is equal to one for months between November 2007 and February 2009 (zero otherwise). The 
four Macro variables are: inflation (infl), industrial production (ind-prod), unemployment (unempl) and 1-month interest rate (int-rate). Standard errors are in parentheses 
and asterisks refer to the level of significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.10. 
  



DC

FC



DC

FC

infl   nd-prod   unempl   int-rate 

R2   F-Test 
Panel A                          
CCI -0.113***   0.240**   0.001     0.101***  -0.167***    -0.182   0.023   -0.817   0.374**   0.302   
  (0.023)   (0.116)   (0.003)     (0.018)  (0.049)    (0.203)   (0.084)   (1.001)   (0.187)       
Qi (Ability to save) -0.133***   0.294**   0.001     0.039**  -0.091**    -0.097   -0.086   -0.088   0.187   0.097   
  (0.030)   (0.115)   (0.003)     (0.016)  (0.044)    (0.179)   (0.074)   (0.851)   (0.165)       
Qii (Personal finances) -0.141***   0.346***   0.001     0.040***  -0.104***    -0.133   -0.062   0.125   0.172   0.170   
  (0.032)   (0.091)   (0.002)     (0.011)  (0.032)    (0.134)   (0.055)   (0.646)   (0.125)       
Qiii (Economic situation) -0.104***   0.391*   0.001     0.172***  -0.220**    -0.484   -0.027   -0.040   0.277   0.218   
  (0.026)   (0.210)   (0.005)     (0.031)  (0.089)    (0.367)   (0.152)   (1.791)   (0.338)       
-Qiv (Unemployment) -0.111***   0.007   -0.000     0.152***  -0.251**    -0.026   0.267   -3.196   0.897**   0.268   
  (0.023)   (0.248)   (0.006)     (0.037)  (0.105)    (0.432)   (0.179)   (2.140)   (0.393)       
                          
Panel B                          
CCI -0.135***   0.086   -0.000   -0.012**   0.073***   -0.138***   0.099*   -0.227   -0.052   -0.681   0.282   0.340   13.05*** 
  (0.023)   (0.121)   (0.003)   (0.005)   (0.019)   (0.049)   (0.051)   (0.199)   (0.083)   (0.975)   (0.183)         
Qi (Ability to save) -0.135***   0.271**   0.001   -0.003   0.037**   -0.089**   -0.007   -0.095   -0.096   -0.020   0.173   0.091   1.86 
  (0.030)   (0.121)   (0.003)   (0.004)   (0.017)   (0.044)   (0.047)   (0.181)   (0.076)   (0.860)   (0.168)         
Qii (Personal finances) -0.217***   0.313***   0.002   -0.013***   0.022*   -0.085***   0.038   -0.142   -0.113**   0.213   0.138   0.235   8.28*** 
  (0.035)   (0.088)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.012)   (0.032)   (0.034)   (0.129)   (0.054)   (0.621)   (0.120)         
Qiii (Economic situation) -0.139***   0.157   -0.000   -0.025***   0.148***   -0.197**   -0.001   -0.462   -0.107   0.059   0.189   0.239   2.66* 
  (0.028)   (0.222)   (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.034)   (0.089)   (0.095)   (0.365)   (0.153)   (1.769)   (0.336)         
-Qiv (Unemployment) -0.112***   -0.269   -0.003   -0.011   0.088**   -0.176*   0.370***   -0.225   0.127   -2.646   0.673*   0.315   15.44*** 
  (0.022)   (0.258)   (0.006)   (0.010)   (0.039)   (0.103)   (0.109)   (0.422)   (0.178)   (2.083)   (0.386)         
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Table 7. ECM estimates of Eq. 2 for France, Germany and the UK, 1990-2010. DC is equal to one for months between March 2000 and September 
2002 (zero otherwise). The four Macro variables are: inflation (infl), industrial production (ind-prod), unemployment (unempl) and 1-month interest 
rate (int-rate). The German and French data are winsorized at 99%. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: 
***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.10. 
  



DC
 


DC
 
infl   nd-prod   unempl   int-rate 

R2   
Panel A. France                       
CCI -0.185***  -0.034   -0.001     0.142***  -0.243**    -0.697   -0.021   -8.964***  -0.180  0.192  
  (0.035)  (0.367)   (0.008)     (0.038)  (0.116)    (0.693)   (0.151)   (2.621)   (0.200)      
Qii (Personal finances) 
-0.192***  0.264   0.001     0.035*  -0.079    -0.614*  -0.047   -1.991   -0.004   0.102  
  (0.039)  (0.194)   (0.004)     (0.020)  (0.062)    (0.371)   (0.081)   (1.335)   (0.107)      
Qiii (Economic situation) 
-0.211***  0.304   0.005     0.198***  -0.302*    -1.566   -0.046   -6.248   -0.173   0.159  
  (0.041)   (0.585)   (0.013)     (0.061)  (0.188)     (1.126)   (0.245)   (4.136)   (0.323)      
Panel B. Germany                       
CCI -0.121***  0.321*  0.005   0.082**  -0.121*   -0.439  0.017  -4.047  1.698*  0.162  
  (0.038)  (0.185)  (0.006)   (0.031)  (0.065)   (0.461)  (0.123)  (2.921)  (0.927)    
Qii (Personal finances) 
-0.157***  0.131  -0.001   0.043**  -0.059*   -0.666**  0.040  0.194  0.233  0.124  
  (0.042)  (0.110)  (0.004)   (0.018)  (0.037)   (0.261)  (0.068)  (1.679)  (0.507)    
Qiii (Economic situation) 
-0.070**  0.417  0.005   0.117**  -0.252***   -0.144  0.062  -5.579  3.125**  0.187  
  (0.030)  (0.258)  (0.009)   (0.045)  (0.093)   (0.658)  (0.174)  (4.264)  (1.325)    
Panel C. The UK                       
CCI -0.150***  0.566   -0.008     0.212***  -0.425***    0.130   -0.012   1.380   1.045   0.156  
  (0.035)  (0.554)   (0.007)     (0.046)  (0.114)    (0.413)   (0.213)   (1.966)   (0.662)      
Qii (Personal finances) 
-0.120***  0.245   0.001     0.169***  -0.351***    0.062   -0.018   2.688   -0.239   0.109  
  (0.030)  (0.524)   (0.006)     (0.043)  (0.107)    (0.388)   (0.201)   (1.796)   (0.606)      
Qiii (Economic situation) 
-0.175***  2.001*  -0.007     0.339***  -0.714***    0.397   -0.174   2.624   1.462   0.157  
  (0.036)  (1.021)   (0.012)     (0.081)  (0.202)    (0.733)   (0.381)   (3.488)   (1.168)      
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Table 8. ECM estimates of Eq. 3 for France, Germany and the UK, 1990-2010, and the F-tests of equality between DC and FC . DC is equal to one for months between 
March 2000 and September 2002 (zero otherwise) and FC is equal to one for months between November 2007 and February 2009 (zero otherwise). The four Macro 
variables are: inflation (infl), industrial production (ind-prod), unemployment (unempl) and 1-month interest rate (int-rate). The German and French data are winsorized at 
99%. Standard errors are in parentheses and asterisks refer to the level of significance: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.10. 
  



DC

FC



DC

FC

infl   nd-prod   unempl   int-rate 

R2   F-Test 
Panel A. France                          
CCI -0.198***  -0.208   -0.003   -0.017*  0.123***  -0.224*  0.029   -0.772   -0.072   -8.884***  -0.225  0.199   2.53* 
  (0.036)  (0.376)   (0.008)   (0.010)  (0.041)  (0.117)   (0.123)   (0.696)   (0.153)   (2.615)  (0.201)         
Qii (Personal finances) 
-0.262***  0.112   0.000   -0.023***  0.029  -0.075   -0.095   -0.565   -0.103   -2.354*  -0.047   0.152   0.06 
  (0.043)  (0.193)   (0.004)   (0.006)  (0.021)  (0.061)   (0.064)   (0.363)   (0.080)   (1.302)  (0.105)         
Qiii (Economic situation) 
-0.238***  -0.038   0.002   -0.039**  0.166**  -0.278   -0.029   -1.598   -0.146   -6.422   -0.267   0.174   0.95 

(0.042)   (0.596)   (0.013)   (0.016)   (0.066)   (0.188)   (0.197)   (1.123)   (0.246)   (4.108)   (0.322)         
Panel B. Germany                          
CCI -0.157***  0.104  -0.002  -0.024**  0.071**  -0.112*  -0.028  -0.416  -0.054  -3.363  1.447  0.180  0.61 
  (0.041)  (0.205)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.066)  (0.100)  (0.456)  (0.127)  (2.905)  (0.936)     
Qii (Personal finances) 
-0.170***  0.059  -0.003  -0.009  0.046**  -0.064*  -0.068  -0.660**  0.029  0.480  0.162  0.130  0.00 
  (0.043)  (0.122)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.019)  (0.038)  (0.057)  (0.260)  (0.069)  (1.686)  (0.521)     
Qiii (Economic situation) 
-0.101***  0.105  -0.005  -0.032**  0.099**  -0.237**  -0.001  -0.113  -0.027  -4.954  2.808**  0.200  2.30 

(0.034)  (0.294)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.048)  (0.094)  (0.143)  (0.653)  (0.178)  (4.240)  (1.337)     
Panel C. The UK                          
CCI -0.188***  -0.297   -0.008   -0.029***  0.199***  -0.414***  -0.041   0.102   -0.091   1.949   0.769   0.177   5.52** 
  (0.037)  (0.635)   (0.007)   (0.010)  (0.049)  (0.115)  (0.133)   (0.411)   (0.215)   (1.952)   (0.668)         
Qii (Personal finances) 
-0.164***  -0.794   0.002   -0.036***  0.141***  -0.320***  0.029   -0.020   -0.127   3.922**  -0.777   0.155   5.65** 
  (0.031)  (0.579)   (0.006)   (0.010)  (0.046)  (0.106)  (0.123)   (0.381)   (0.199)   (1.777)   (0.609)         
Qiii (Economic situation) 
-0.209***  1.128   -0.006   -0.050***  0.366***  -0.744***  -0.409  0.480   -0.202   3.475   1.208   0.182   1.41 

(0.037)   (1.110)   (0.012)   (0.018)   (0.088)   (0.203)   (0.235)   (0.728)   (0.382)   (3.458)   (1.178)         
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Notes 
                                                             
1  Similarly to stock markets, consumer confidence is not just an indicator of economic conditions, 
but also a factor which potentially influences them. When consumer attitudes are positive 
(negative), they are more likely to spend more (less) money, contributing to the very economic 
growth (slowdown) they anticipate. 
2  http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/press/TechnicalPDF_4134_1298367128.pdf 
3  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication_summary7570_en.htm (The Joint 
Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys, European Economy. Special 
Report, January 2006).  
4  In the long run, there is evidence that the level of sentiment predicts stock returns, i.e., when 
investors are overoptimistic, future returns over multiyear horizons will be low, and vice versa 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Bathia and Bredin, 2012; Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Chen, 
2011; Fisher and Statman, 2000; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Neal and Wheatley, 1998; 
Schmeling, 2009; Solt and Statman, 1988; Verma and Verma, 2008). 
5  E.g., Lee et al. (1991), Chen et al. (1993), Neal and Wheatley (1998), Brown and Cliff (2004), 
Doukas and Milonas (2004), Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007), Kurov (2010), Hwang (2011), the 
papers in the special issue of the Journal of Financial Economics 2012, 104(2). 
6  The three countries used in the regression analysis were dropped from Figure 1 because of shorter 
GDP time series. The equally-weighted average stock market index of these nine EU countries is 
correlated at 98% with the EU12 equally-weighted average stock market index used in the 
regression analysis. 
7  Hon et al. (2007) show that the collapse of OECD stock markets was tied to close links across 
sectors (particularly in the technology, media, and telecommunication), and could not be attributed 
to widespread contagion. 
8  http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2001-01-30-confidence-pre.htm 
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9  Other developed countries have data with incompatible methodologies (e.g., Japan), too short 
times series of monthly data (e.g., Canada, Portugal), or stopped collecting data all together (e.g., 
Ireland). 
10  Three countries have shorter CCIs. These are Austria (October 1995), Sweden (October 1995) and 
Finland (November 1995).  
11 It does not seem correct to lag stock market returns more, as the period of the calculation of returns 
would include a period of the previous month survey collection. If consumers take stock markets 
news into account, it can be expected that they would have already incorporated last month stock 
market news into their previous month predictions. 
12  We do not use the Consumer Confidence Survey published by the Conference Board because its 
forecasting questions ask about subjects’ expectations over the next six months (not 12 months)  
and do not refer to ‘country wide’ conditions but to conditions ‘in the area’. Moreover, the 
questions have only three possible answers: positive, negative and neutral.       
13  It can be shown that the multiplier of the linear transformation is approximately 5/6.7558. 
14  We replicated the analysis on returns of S&P500, and of the equally-weighted average of NYSE 
Composite and NASDAQ100. The results remained unchanged and can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
15  Tetlock (2007) rejects the hypothesis that media content contains new information about 
fundamental asset values or is a sideshow with no relation to asset markets. 
16 For the sake of space we do not present the results, but they can be obtained from the authors on 
request. 
17  The Kalman Filter regression was also run including the changes in the four macro variables. The 
estimate of the time path of the  coefficient remained practically identical. 
18  To save space we do not present the results of the cointegration tests, but they rejected the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration for all variables at the individual country level and for EU12. 
19  Using a ‘classic’ specification with lag values of p and Macros would be consistent with the 
assumption that consumers expect that the current situation will not change, i.e., the future is 
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going to be exactly as the current state of the world. However, although this is rather unrealistic, 
we also tried this specification. The main results, i.e., the statistically significant decline in the 
SM-CC relationship, remained unchanged.    
20 For Qiv we use -CC instead of CC so the sign of the ,  and  coefficients are consistent with 
those estimated for questions Qi-Qiii. This, however, results in obtaining an opposite sign for θ, 
i.e., θ becomes positive. 
21 The long-term effects obtained for the regression specifications presented in Tables 5-8 are similar, 
i.e., the coefficients estimated for p are always statistically significant while the coefficients 
estimated for the Macro variables differ in their significance (including the unemployment 
variable).  
22  The Hausman test comparing the MG and PMG techniques was inconclusive. 
